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This paper provides empirical evidence of Medicaid crowd out of demand for private long-term care
insurance. Using data on the near- and young-elderly in the Health and Retirement Survey, our central
estimate suggests that a $10,000 decrease in the level of assets an individual can keep while qualifying
for Medicaid would increase private long-term care insurance coverage by 1.1 percentage points. These
estimates imply that if every state in the country moved from their current Medicaid asset eligibility
requirements to the most stringent Medicaid eligibility requirements allowed by federal law â a
change that would decrease average household assets protected by Medicaid by about $25,000 â
demand for private long-term care insurance would rise by 2.7 percentage points. While this represents
a 30 percent increase in insurance coverage relative to the baseline ownership rate of 9.1 percent, it
also indicates that the vast majority of households would still find it unattractive to purchase private
insurance. We discuss reasons why, even with extremely stringent eligibility requirements, Medicaid
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Expenditures on long-term care, such as home health care and nursing homes, accounted for 8.5 
percent of all health care spending in the United States in 2004 (Congressional Budget Office, 2004).  
These long-term care expenditures are projected to triple in real terms over the next few decades, in large 
part due to the aging of the population (Congressional Budget Office, 1999). Because over one-third of 
Medicaid expenditures are already devoted to long-term care (U.S. Congress, 2004), there is rising 
concern among policy makers about the fiscal pressure that further growth in long-term care expenditures 
will place on federal and state budgets in the years to come, and growing interest in stimulating the 
market for private long-term care insurance. For example, in a much-publicized press release issued in 
October 2004, the National Governors Association announced that states spent nearly as much money on 
Medicaid in fiscal year 2003 as they did on K-12 education, and expressed concern that Medicaid is 
putting a “squeeze” on state budgets going forward (National Governors Association, 2004).     
The market for private long-term care insurance is currently quite limited. Only about 10 percent of 
the elderly have private long-term care insurance (Brown and Finkelstein, 2004a). Because these policies 
tend to be quite limited in scope, only 4 percent of total long-term care expenditures are paid for by 
private insurance (Congressional Budget Office, 2004). By contrast, in the health care sector as a whole, 
35 percent of expenditures are covered by private insurance (National Center for Health Statistics, 2002). 
Medicaid provides public long-term care insurance in the form of a payer-of-last resort. It covers 
long-term care expenditures only after the individual has met asset and income eligibility tests, and after 
any private insurance policy held by the individual has paid any benefits it owes. In this paper we explore 
how changes in Medicaid’s means-tested eligibility thresholds might affect demand for private long-term 
care insurance.   
We use data from the 1996, 1998 and 2000 waves of the Health and Retirement Survey to study the 
effect of Medicaid asset protection rules on private long-term care insurance coverage among individuals 
aged 55 to 69. To investigate Medicaid’s impact, we draw on the substantial variation across individuals 
in the amount of assets that can be protected from Medicaid based on their state of residence, marital   2
status and asset holdings. Due to the potential endogeneity of asset holdings to these Medicaid rules, we 
predict assets based on demographic characteristics of the individual.  
We find statistically significant evidence that more generous Medicaid asset protection is associated 
with lower levels of private long-term care insurance coverage. Our central estimate is that a $10,000 
increase in the amount of assets an individual can protect from Medicaid is associated with a decrease in 
private long-term care insurance coverage of 1.1 percentage points. This implies, for example, that if all 
states were to adopt the most stringent asset eligibility requirements allowed by federal law in 2000 – 
$16,824 for a married couple and $2,000 for a single individual – and thereby decrease average protected 
assets by about $25,000, overall demand for private long-term care insurance would rise by 2.7 
percentage points. While such an increase is large relative to the existing ownership rate in our sample of 
near-elderly and young elderly of 9.1 percent, it suggests that the vast majority of these individuals would 
remain uninsured.  
Our empirical findings complement recent simulation-based estimates of the impact of Medicaid on 
private long-term care insurance demand (Brown and Finkelstein, 2004b). Like our empirical estimates, 
these simulation results also suggest that changes in Medicaid’s asset disregards are unlikely to have a 
substantial effect on private long-term care insurance demand. At the same time, however, Brown and 
Finkelstein (2004b) estimate that Medicaid may be able to explain the lack of private insurance purchases 
for at least two-thirds of the wealth distribution, even if there were no other factors limiting the size of the 
market.  This is because Medicaid imposes a substantial implicit tax on private long-term care insurance; 
for example, they estimate that about 60 to 75 percent of the expected present discounted value benefits 
that a median wealth individual would receive from a typical private long-term care insurance policy are 
redundant of benefits that Medicaid would have provided had the individual not purchased private 
insurance.  Changes in Medicaid’s asset disregards, however, do not have a large effect on this implicit 
tax. Together, the empirical and simulation results underscore the importance of understanding the 
mechanism behind the crowd out effect of a particular public program in considering the likely impact of 
potential reforms to the public program on private demand.   3
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section one provides background information on long-term 
care expenditure risk and the nature of existing public and private insurance coverage for this risk. It also 
briefly reviews the insights from simulation estimates of how Medicaid affects private long-term care 
insurance demand. Section two presents the data and empirical framework. Section three presents our 
crowd-out estimates. Section four uses these crowd-out estimates to simulate the likely effects of changes 
in Medicaid means-testing thresholds. Section five concludes. 
1. Background on long-term care insurance and Medicaid crowd out  
Long-term care represents a significant source of financial uncertainty for elderly households.  
Although most 65 year olds will never enter a nursing home, of those who do enter a nursing home, 12 
percent of men and 22 percent of women will spend more than 3 years there; one-in-eight women who 
enter a nursing home will spend more than 5 years there (Brown and Finkelstein, 2004b).  These stays are 
costly. On average, a year in a nursing home costs $50,000 in 2002 for a semi-private room, and even 
more for a private room (MetLife, 2002).  
Very little of this expenditure risk is covered by private insurance.  According to the 2000 Health and 
Retirement Survey, among those individuals aged 60 and over, only 10.5 percent own private long-term 
care insurance. Moreover, Brown and Finkelstein (2004a) estimate that the typical purchased policy 
covers only about one-third of EPDV long term care expenditures. As a result, only about 4 percent of 
long-term care expenditures are paid for by private insurance, while about one-third are paid for out of 
pocket (Congressional Budget Office, 2004); by contrast in the health sector as a whole, private insurance 
pays for 35 percent of expenditures and only 17 percent are paid for out of pocket (National Center for 
Health Statistics, 2002). Medicaid pays for about 35 percent of long-term care expenditures 
(Congressional Budget Office, 2004).
1 
                                                 
1 This leaves a remaining one-quarter of expenses that are covered by Medicare. However, this apparently large 
Medicare share is somewhat misleading. About half of Medicare long-term care spending consists of Medicare’s 
home health care benefit, which is a genuine long-term care service. However, the other half comes from Medicare’s 
coverage of short-term, skilled nursing home facilities following an acute hospital stay; this is not the custodial 
nursing home care that accounts for the vast majority of nursing home days and is covered by private long-term care   4
An extensive theoretical literature has proposed a host of potential explanations for the limited size of 
the private long-term care insurance market. These explanations include both factors that constrain supply 
and factors that limit demand.  Norton (2000) provides a useful overview of the various potential 
explanations.  
On the supply side, market function may be impaired by such problems as high transactions costs, 
imperfect competition, asymmetric information, or dynamic problems with long-term contracting. There 
is evidence consistent with the existence of many of these supply-side failures in the private long-term 
care insurance market. Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) provide evidence of asymmetric information in 
the market. There is also evidence of dynamic contracting problems arising both from the difficulty of 
insuring the aggregate risk of rising medical costs (Cutler, 1996) and from dynamic adverse selection as 
individuals who learn that they are better risks than expected drop out of the market (Finkelstein et al., 
2005).  Brown and Finkelstein (2004a) present evidence that premiums are marked up about 18 cents per 
dollar of premium above actuarially fair levels; this markup appears to reflect a combination of 
transaction costs and imperfect competition.  
On the demand side, several different factors that may constrain the private insurance market have 
been suggested. Limited consumer rationality – such as difficulty understanding low-probability high-loss 
events (Kunreuther, 1978) or misconceptions about the extent of public health insurance coverage for 
long-term care – may play a role. Demand may also be limited by the availability of imperfect but 
cheaper substitutes, such as financial transfers from children, unpaid care provided directly by family 
members in lieu of formal paid care, or the public insurance provided by the means-tested Medicaid 
program (Pauly, 1990; Brown and Finkelstein, 2004b).      
There is evidence that these demand side factors are likely to be important in understanding the 
limited size of the private market. Brown and Finkelstein (2004a) suggest that the loads on policies – and 
whatever market failures produce them – are unlikely to be sufficient to explain the limited market size. 
                                                                                                                                                             
insurance and by Medicaid, and is somewhat misleadingly included in long term care spending estimates.  
(Congressional Budget Office 2004, US Congress, 2000).   5
They note that the average load on a typical private policy is about 50 cents on the dollar higher for men 
than women, yet ownership patterns are extremely similar by gender, a fact that cannot be explained 
solely by the within-household correlation in ownership patterns.  This suggests an important role for 
demand side factors such as Medicaid. 
Brown and Finkelstein (2004b) provide more direct evidence of a crowd out effect of Medicaid. They 
develop and calibrate a utility-based model of an elderly, life cycle consumer’s demand for private long-
term care insurance and compare demand under various counterfactual assumptions regarding the nature 
of private insurance and of the Medicaid program. Their simulations suggest that given the current 
structure of Medicaid, even if actuarially fair, comprehensive private insurance policies were to be 
available, at least two-thirds of the wealth distribution would still not purchase this insurance. They show 
that the mechanism behind this large estimated Medicaid crowd out effect stems from the fact that a large 
portion of private insurance benefits are redundant of benefits that Medicaid would have provided in the 
absence of private insurance, a phenomenon that they label the Medicaid “implicit tax”. For a male 
(female) at the median of the wealth distribution, they estimate that 60 percent (75 percent) of the benefits 
from a private policy are redundant of benefits that Medicaid would otherwise have paid.   
The Medicaid implicit tax stems from two features of Medicaid’s design that results in private 
insurance reducing expected Medicaid expenditures. First, by protecting assets against negative 
expenditure shocks, private insurance reduces the likelihood that an individual will meet Medicaid’s 
asset-eligibility requirement. Second, Medicaid is a secondary payer when the individual has private 
insurance.  This secondary payer status means that if an individual has private insurance, the private 
policy pays first, even if the individual’s asset and income levels make him otherwise eligible for 
Medicaid; Medicaid then covers any expenditures not reimbursed by the private policy.
2  
                                                 
2 Understanding Medicaid’s implicit tax also helps explain the ostensibly puzzling finding that men and women 
purchase private insurance in very similar proportions, despite substantially higher loads on male policies. Since 
women have much higher expected lifetime long-term care utilization, the expected proportion of long-term care 
expenditures paid for by Medicaid is higher for women than men of the same asset levels, and thus the Medicaid 
implicit tax on private insurance is higher for women than for men. Indeed, Brown and Finkelstein (2004b) show   6
Brown and Finkelstein (2004b) estimate that changes in Medicaid’s asset disregards would not have a 
substantial effect on the Medicaid implicit tax, and thus, would not make private long term care insurance 
desirable for most of the wealth distribution.  Specifically, they simulate the likely effect of a policy that 
has been adopted in several states which makes the Medicaid asset disregards less stringent if the 
individual purchases private insurance. They estimate that such a policy would not however, have much 
effect on the implicit tax or on private insurance demand because, even in the absence of any asset 
eligibility requirements – i.e. complete asset protection for individuals – Medicaid still imposes a 
substantial implicit tax on private insurance through its status as a secondary payer.  
This paper extends the simulation analysis in Brown and Finkelstein (2004b) to examine empirically 
how the amount of assets that Medicaid allows an individual to keep while receiving Medicaid coverage 
for long term care expenses affects demand for private long-term care insurance.  Our empirical estimates 
of the crowd-out effect of Medicaid on private long-term care insurance demand are also related to a 
sizeable empirical literature that has investigated the extent of Medicaid’s crowd out of acute private 
health insurance among working families. The estimates from this literature range in magnitude, but at the 
upper end suggest that up to half of the increase in public insurance coverage from increased Medicaid 
eligibility is offset by reductions in private insurance coverage (see Gruber, 2003 for a review of this 
literature).   
To our knowledge, only two other empirical papers have examined the impact of Medicaid on private 
long term care insurance demand. Sloan and Norton (1997) compare private long-term care insurance 
holdings in the 1992 and 1994 HRS and the 1993 AHEAD across individuals in states with different 
Medicaid income eligibility limits. They find evidence that higher Medicaid income eligibility limits are 
associated with lower probability of owning long-term care insurance in the AHEAD data (ages 70+) but 
not in the HRS data (ages 51 – 64); they do not examine the effect of asset limits. Kang et al (2004) use 
the 1992 through 1998 waves of the HRS to examine the effect of Medicaid asset and income tests on 
                                                                                                                                                             
that the net loads on polices – i.e. the load on the net benefits from the private policy, which omits any benefits paid 
by the private policy that Medicaid would otherwise have paid – are quite similar for men and women.   7
private insurance coverage, using variation in individual financial resources and state Medicaid eligibility 
limits. They find evidence consistent with a crowd out effect of less stringent Medicaid asset eligibility 
limits, but not evidence of an effect of Medicaid income limits on long-term care insurance coverage.  
Our paper builds on this earlier work in two important dimensions. First, we limit our attention to 
data from 1996 and later waves of the HRS since prior survey waves utilized a confusing question to 
ascertain long-term care insurance coverage, resulting in substantial under-reporting (coverage rates are 
about one-fifth of what other surveys from that time suggest) and, more generally, extremely poor data 
quality; see Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) (Appendix A) for more details on these data issues. Second, 
both papers utilize differences in state Medicaid rules to identify the impact of Medicaid on long-term 
care insurance demand; however, there are other potentially important determinants of the demand for 
long-term care insurance that vary by state, such as the price and quality of nursing homes.  Our empirical 
approach allows us to surmount this concern, as we discuss in more detail below.  
2. Data and Empirical Approach 
2.1 Data and Summary Statistics on Long-Term Care Insurance Coverage 
We use data from the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS), a nationally representative sample of the 
elderly and near-elderly. We use a restricted access version of the HRS that allows us to identify the 
individual’s state of residence. Our analysis uses data from the 1996, 1998 and 2000 waves of the HRS. 
The 1996 wave consists exclusively of individuals from the original HRS cohort (individuals born 1931 
to 1941). The 1998 and 2000 waves also include individuals from the adjacent, younger cohort (born 
1942 to 1947), and the adjacent older cohort (born 1924 – 1930); these are known respectively as the 
“War Baby” cohort and the “Children of the Depression” (CODA) cohort. We limit the analysis to 
individuals aged 55 to 69 in each wave. As discussed, we do not use data from waves prior to 1995 due to 
data issues with the measurement of long-term care insurance coverage; we exclude the 1995 AHEAD 
wave because individuals in this wave are outside our age range.   
We limit our analysis to individuals aged 55 to 69 to focus on the decisions of individuals who are in 
the prime buying ages for long-term care insurance (HIAA, 2000).  Once purchased, the policy is   8
intended to be a “lifetime” policy; indeed, subsequent annual premiums are constant in nominal terms, so 
that policy payments are quite front-loaded. As a result, it is important to examine the effect of Medicaid 
rules that were in effect when an individual might be considering the purchase of private long-term care 
insurance. For this reason, we particularly wish to exclude individuals aged 70 and over from the analysis. 
Such individuals may well have been making their purchase decisions in the mid to late 1980s, during 
which Medicaid eligibility rules were substantially different than they are today. Crucially for our 
empirical strategy, which relies on the differential treatment of married and single individuals within 
different states, these rules would not have varied within state by marital status prior to 1989.
3 The current 
structure of Medicaid eligibility rules was adopted with the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988, 
which was implemented in 1989 (Stone, 2002).    
Because of the panel nature of the data, we observe many individuals multiple times over the waves. 
Our full sample consists of 28,100 observations on 12,402 unique individuals. We account for the 
multiple observations of the same individuals in the error structure in our regression analysis. We do not, 
however, directly exploit the panel nature of the data and the changes in Medicaid eligibility rules for 
specific individuals over time due to changes in martial status or – more commonly – changes in state 
rules. We believe the use of such changes provide a questionable form of identification since it is unclear 
under which set of rules the individual made the (lifetime) purchase of long-term care insurance.  Indeed, 
as we discuss in more detail below, our preferred specification limits the analysis to the sub-sample of 
individuals who did not change marital status between 1996 and 2000 and who live in one of the 30 states 
which have not had any real changes to their Medicaid asset allowances between 1991 and 2000 (see 
Appendix A for details).  We refer to this sub-sample as the “Constant Medicaid rules sub-sample” 
because the individuals faced constant Medicaid rules over our time period. They represent an arguably 
cleaner sample on which to analyze the crowd-out effects of Medicaid as there is considerably less 
                                                 
3 Consistent with this, using our empirical strategy we find statistically insignificant effects of current (1996 – 2000) 
Medicaid rules on long-term care insurance coverage for individuals who are 70 and older (mean age of 79) and who 
therefore may have been at the prime buying age under a very different set of rules (results not reported). We also 
show in the sensitivity analysis below that the crowd-out effects we estimate in our 55-69 year old sample are 
stronger at younger ages within this range.   9
uncertainty about what rules were in effect when the individuals bought (or considered buying) long-term 
care insurance.  
Table 1 presents some summary statistics for both the full sample (column 1) and the constant 
Medicaid rules sub-sample (column 2). All statistics are based on using household weights. We focus on 
the summary statistics for the sub-sample in column 2, although the results are generally similar. The 
long-term care insurance coverage rate is 9.1 percent. This is comparable to the rates found in other 
surveys for similar age ranges (see e.g. HIAA, 2000). Just over 70 percent of the sample is married, just 
under half is male, and about two-fifths are retired.   
The average long-term care insurance coverage rate masks important variation across sub-groups in 
their long-term care insurance holdings. Table 2 therefore presents summary statistics on long-term care 
ownership rates separately by various covariates. Once again, column 1 presents the results for the full 
sample, and column 2 presents results for the constant Medicaid rules sub-sample. Coverage rates are 
similar by gender, and higher for married individuals than single individuals (10.0 percent vs. 7.1 
percent). Coverage rates are higher among 62 to 69 year olds (10.4 percent) than among 55 to 61 year 
olds (8.1 percent). Coverage rates also vary across states; the inter-quartile range in long-term care 
insurance coverage rates across states ranges from 0.06 to 0.12 (not shown).  
The pattern of coverage by net worth is most dramatic. Less than 4 percent of the sample in the 
bottom quartile owns long-term care insurance, compared to 15 percent in the highest quartile of net 
worth.  In fact, long-term care insurance coverage rates increase monotonically by wealth decile, from 
0.03 percent in the bottom decile to 0.17 percent in the top.  The wealth profile likely reflects the fact that 
the means-tested eligibility requirements of Medicaid make it a better substitute for private insurance for 
lower wealth individuals.  
2.2 Overview of Medicaid rules and our empirical approach 
We focus our analysis on the impact on private long-term care insurance demand of the amount of 
protected financial assets that an individual can keep while still receiving Medicaid reimbursement for 
long-term care utilization. Below, we show that other Medicaid rules such as the minimum allowable   10
income retention for the community spouse or the treatment of the community house’s spouse upon its 
sale or her death do not appear to affect insurance coverage, and do not affect our estimate of the effect of 
the asset rules on insurance coverage.  
Medicaid financial asset disregards exhibit substantial variation across individuals based on an 
individual’s marital status, state of residence, and asset holdings. Our empirical strategy, broadly 
speaking, is to control for any direct effects of marital status, state, and assets holdings on long-term care 
insurance demand, and then to identify the impact of Medicaid on long-term care insurance demand using 
the variation in Medicaid generosity that exists across higher interactions of these three variables (i.e. 
assets by marital status, state by marital status, and assets by state, as well as assets by state by marital 
status). Thus for example, we use both differences across states in the amount of assets protected for 
married individuals relative to single individuals, and differences across states in the amount of assets 
protected for individuals of different asset levels to identify the impact of Medicaid’s asset protection 
rules on demand for private long-term care insurance. Throughout the analysis, we use predicted assets to 
deal with the potential endogeneity of assets to Medicaid spend down rules (Coe, 2005). 
Medicaid asset rules for single individuals are relatively simple and uniform across states and 
particularly within states: they do not vary with the assets of the individual (as long as the individual has 
assets of more than the protected amount). The modal state rule (used by nearly 70 percent of states) 
allowed single individuals receiving Medicaid coverage for nursing home care to retain no more than 
$2,000 in financial wealth. The remaining states had asset limits ranging from $1,500 to $6,500. 
In contrast, the amount of assets a community spouse is allowed to keep when her spouse goes into a 
nursing home exhibits substantial variation across states at a given household asset level, from a 
minimum of $16,824 to a maximum of $84,120 in 2000.  Moreover, the amount of assets a community 
spouse can keep varies with household assets, and this difference across states is highly non-monotonic in 
the level of household assets.   
For married households with assets below the minimum amount that federal law requires be kept 
when one spouse is in a nursing home ($16,824 in 2000), there is no difference across states in Medicaid   11
asset disregards. For most states, there is also no difference in the amount of assets the married couple can 
keep if their assets are more than double the maximum amount that federal law allows to be kept when 
one spouse is in a nursing home (which puts the asset amount at $168,240 in 2000).  However, for 
married households within this range – which corresponds to roughly the 20
th to 60
th percentile of the 
asset distribution for married households in the relevant age range in the 2000 HRS– there are substantial 
differences across states in the amount of assets that a married household can keep under Medicaid.  
By way of illustration, Figure 1graphs the difference in the amount of assets a community spouse can 
keep as a function of total household financial assets in the two most common sets of state rules. Under 
the most common set of rules – which is used in 26 states – the community spouse is allowed to keep all 
of their assets up to the federally allowed maximum protected assets ($84,120 in 2000) after which they 
face a 100% marginal tax rate on all further assets. In the second most common set of rules – which is 
used in another 15 states – the community spouse is allowed to keep all of her assets up to the federally 
allowed minimum protected assets ($16,824 in 2000), faces a 100 percent marginal tax rates on all assets 
between this federal minimum and two times the minimum, faces a 50 percent marginal tax rate on all 
assets between twice the federal minimum and twice the federal maximum, and a 100 percent marginal 
tax rate on all assets above twice the federal maximum.   
As seen in Figure 1, the difference in amount of protected assets that a community spouse with a 
given amount of assets faces varies non-monotonically with assets. Using the asset distribution for 
married households in our age range in the 2000 HRS, we estimate that moving from the most common 
set of state rules to the next most common would on average allow a married household to keep $21,715 
more in assets when one spouse entered a nursing home, which represents 29 percent of average financial 
assets in this range. The maximum difference in the amount of assets that a household would be able to 
keep is $42,060 and occurs for household with assets of $84,120. The minimum difference in protected 
assets is 0, and occurs for household with assets of less than $16,824 or more than $168,240. If we were 
instead compared these most common state rules (which are also the most generous in terms of the 
amount of protected assets allowed for married couples) to the least generous state rules (used by 3 states)   12
the maximum difference in the amount of assets the household would be able to keep would rise to 
$67,296 (which would occur in households with $84,120 or more in assets).  
To sum up, we exploit several key sources of variation in the amount of protected assets to identify 
the impact of Medicaid asset protection on demand for private long term care insurance. These include: 
differences across states in the average asset disregards for married and single individuals, differences 
across married individuals of different asset levels in different states, and differences across married and 
single individuals of different asset amounts, as well as higher order interactions between state of 
residence, marital status, and assets.  In all cases, we control for any direct effects of asset levels, marital 
status, or state of residence on the probability an individual has private long term care insurance. For 
interested readers, Appendix A provides considerably more detailed information on how the Medicaid 
eligibility rules vary across states by marital status and asset level. 
2.3 Econometric Framework 
Temporarily ignoring several econometric concerns (that we will address below), a natural starting 
point would be to estimate the following equation:  
ist ist s X ε η α β β + ′ + + + = ist 2 ist 1 ist Married Protected LTCI     (1)   
In this estimating equation, the dependent variable  ist LTCI  is a binary indicator for whether individual i 
in state s and year t owns long-term care insurance,  ist Married is an indicator variable for whether the 
individual is married and  s α represents a full set of state fixed effects.
4 The vector of covariates (X) 
consist of indicator variables for education categorized by highest degree achieved (less than high school, 
high school, some college, college degree or more), gender, occupation, industry, number of children up 
to 5, Hispanic heritage, race, retired, age, wave, and cohort; in addition; in addition, (X) includes 
interactions of each of the education categories with all of the other control variables.  
                                                 
4 We specify equation (1) as a linear probability model because it allows us to handle instrumental variables most 
flexibly; as we discuss in more detail below, we are concerned about endogeneity of the right hand side variable 
Protected and therefore estimate equation (1) by instrumental variables. We have confirmed, however, that the 
marginal effects from Probit specifications evaluated at the mean yield nearly identical results to the linear 
probability model specified in equation (1).   13
The main covariate of interest is Protected, which we measure in units of $10,000. Protected 
measures the amount of financial assets that a particular household is allowed to keep and still qualify for 
Medicaid reimbursement. A higher level of Protected corresponds to a more generous (less means tested) 
Medicaid program. The mean (median) amount of Protected assets in our sample is $36,345 ($18,152) 
with a standard deviation of $36,135.  
Protected varies across households depending on state of residence (s), marital status (m), and 
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The state sets the level for the minimum and maximum amount of assets protected by the Medicaid 
program, within the constraints imposed by Federal law. We calculate Protectedims for each individual in 
our sample, based on their assets, marital status, and the specific state Medicaid rules detailed in 
Appendix A. 
By including a dummy for whether the individual is married and a full set of state fixed effects we 
control, respectively, for any fixed differences across married and single individuals or across individuals 
in different states in their demand for private long term care insurance. The covariates (X) are designed to 
control for demographics that may directly affect insurance demand, perhaps through their effect on asset 
levels or perhaps through other means. (We do not directly control for assets in equation (1) because of its 
potential endogeneity, although we have verified that controlling flexibly for net worth decile does not in 
fact affect the results).  Protected is therefore identified off of two-way and three-way interactions 
between state, marital status, and assets. 
We note that the state fixed effects allow us to control flexibly for a number of other potentially 
important determinants of demand for private long-term care insurance. They condition out any 
differences across states in the price and quality of nursing homes, which may affect demand for long-
term care insurance. They also condition out any differences across states in the Medicaid program that   14
may influence insurance coverage but are the same for married and single individuals within a state or 
individuals of different asset levels within a state. These include, for example, the Medicaid rules 
regarding the nature and extent of coverage provided for home health care, and the Medicaid 
reimbursement rates relative to private payer rates in the state. Our estimates therefore focus precisely on 
the impact of Medicaid eligibility rules for nursing home coverage on long-term care insurance demand.  
A potential concern with estimating equation (1) is that – as equation (2) makes clear – Protected is a 
function of assets, and therefore savings decisions, which may themselves be affected by Medicaid rules. 
Thus assets may be endogenous to insurance purchase decisions. Indeed, there is empirical evidence that 
the savings of the elderly appear to respond to the incentives embodied in Medicaid’s rules for eligibility 
for coverage for long-term care expenditures (Coe, 2005). This is consistent, more generally, with the 
evidence that savings decisions are affected by the incentives provided by means tested public insurance 
programs (see e.g. Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes, 1995 and Gruber and Yelowitz, 1999).  
To address the potential endogeneity of assets to Medicaid rules, we calculate predicted assets for 
each household based on a reduced form prediction model that uses only plausibly exogenous 
demographic characteristics to predict asset accumulation. Specifically, we estimate: 
ist ist X Assets Log υ δ + ′ = ist ) (           ( 3 )    
We estimate the asset equation in logs because the highly skewed nature of the asset distribution results in 
a much better fit in predicting log assets than assets.  We define assets to be Medicaid-taxable assets; 
these are the same as net worth for single individuals, but exclude housing wealth from net worth for 
married individuals, since housing wealth is not treated as a Medicaid-taxable asset for married 
individuals. As covariates we include the same set of covariates used in X in equation (1) that we 
described above. We also include a marital status dummy since savings behavior may well differ across 
single and married individuals. Note that we do not use state dummies – or state Medicaid rules – in 
predicting wealth. The goal of equation (3) is not to develop the best prediction model of assets but to 
isolate the portion of assets that can be explained by plausibly exogenous demographic characteristics   15
rather than asset accumulation decisions that are themselves endogenous to the state Medicaid rules. We 
estimate equation (3) using the full data sample, and household weights. Estimation of the prediction 
equation (3) yields an R-squared of 0.24.  
Using the results of equation (3), we generate predicted assets for each individual in the sample. We 
then use predicted assets – instead of actual assets – as well as the individual’s state of resident and 
marital status to calculate the amount of assets that would be protected by the Medicaid program. We 
refer to these protected assets calculated using predicted rather than actual assets as Protected_Hat. Thus, 
Protected_Hat represents the amount of assets the Medicaid program would disregard if the household’s 
actual assets were as predicted by their characteristics. By contrast, Protected denotes the amount of 
assets the Medicaid program would protect based on their actual (potentially endogenous) assets. Like 
Protected, Protected_Hat is measured in units of $10,000. The mean (median) value of Protected_Hat in 
our sample is $43,121 ($39,929), with a standard deviation of $34,348. 
In the results reported below, we estimate equation (1) by instrumental variables, instrumenting for 
Protected with Protected_Hat.  In all of our regression estimates we use the HRS household weights. We 
adjust the standard errors to allow for an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix in the error term within 
each state. To take account of the sampling variation in the predicted variable Protected_Hat  (Murphy 
and Topel, 1985) we also report standard errors from a non-parametric bootstrap. Specifically, we 
bootstrap the prediction equation (equation 2) and for each iteration of the bootstrap, calculate predicted 
assets, use these to calculate Protected_Hat, and then estimate equation (1) using Protected_Hat as an 
instrument for Protected on the drawn sample; we run 200 iterations of the bootstrap. In practice, the 
standard errors are not affected much by this procedure; we report both sets of standard errors in the 
results below.  
Because we are using multiple waves of the HRS, we calculate Protected using the state rules and 
individual demographics in effect in the year in which the interview takes place.  As mentioned above, 21 
states, affecting 32 percent of the sample, experience real changes in the community spouse asset 
disregards between 1991 and 2000. In addition, about 5 percent of our sample changes marital status over   16
the waves 1996 – 2000 In principle, these changes in state rules and marital status over time provide us 
with a fourth source of variation in Medicaid asset protection rules faced by an individual. We do not, 
however, believe that such changes in Medicaid asset protection are a particularly clean or useful source 
of variation, as it is unclear for these individuals which Medicaid asset protection rules were in effect – 
and thus the relevant rules – when the individual was considering whether to purchase long-term care 
insurance.  Although we report estimation results for the full sample, our preferred specification limits the 
sample to the approximately three-fifths of the original sample (17,623 observations consisting of 7,923 
unique individuals) who did not change martial status between 1996 and 2000 and are from states whose 
Medicaid rules did not change in real terms since 1991. Our estimates of crowd-out become larger and 
more precise in this sub-sample, which is consistent with greater measurement error in the full sample in 
the relevant Medicaid rules in effect when an individual is making his long term care insurance coverage 
decision. 
Finally, it is worth noting a potential limitation to our approach is that we are using current predicted 
assets, while what matters for the Medicaid asset tax is the assets an individual has at the time of nursing 
home entry. This will bias against finding an effect of Medicaid. In practice, however, the relatively low 
rates at which the elderly appear to spend down their assets over their retirements suggest that this may 
not be too great of a problem (see e.g. Hurd 1989, Hurd 2002, and Mitchell and Moore 1997). .  
3. Crowd-out estimates 
Table 3 reports the main results from estimating equation (1) by instrumental variables, using 
Protected_Hat to instrument for Protected. The first column shows the results for the whole sample. The 
coefficient on Protected is -0.0056, and is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. The point 
estimate suggests that a $10,000 increase in the amount of assets an individual can retain while qualifying 
for Medicaid is associated with a 0.56 percentage point decline in long-term care insurance coverage. 
 The remaining columns report analysis when the sample is limited to individuals who face constant 
Medicaid rules. While we lose almost two-fifths of our observations due to these data cuts, we believe 
this sub-sample will provide a cleaner estimate of the impact of Medicaid on long-term care insurance   17
coverage. Consistent with this view, column 2 indicates that the estimated effect of Medicaid on long-
term care insurance demand is larger (and more statistically significant) in the constant Medicaid rules 
sub-sample than in the full sample. The point estimate on Protected rises to -0.109, and is statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level. This suggests that a $10,000 increase in the amount of assets a 
household can hold and still be eligible for Medicaid is associated with a 1.1 percentage point decline in 
the probability of holding long-term care insurance. The results in column 2 constitute our preferred 
specification, and we use these results for our central estimate.  
The remaining columns of Table 3 explore the sensitivity of our central estimate to using different  
sources of variation to identify the effect of Medicaid protected asset rules on long-term care insurance 
demand. As discussed above, variation in Protected_hat comes from the two-way interaction of predicted 
assets with state, the two-way interaction of predicted assets with marital status, the two-way interaction 
of marital status with state, and the three way interaction of marital status, predicted assets, and state. To 
investigate whether each of these sources of variation yields similar results, columns (3) through (6) show 
the results in which we control one by one for various sources of variation, and therefore identify only off 
of the others.  Specifically, in column (3) we add a control for predicted assets interacted with marital 
status, in column (4) we add controls for predicted assets interacted with state dummies, and in column 
(5) in which a we add controls for marital status interacted with state dummies. Finally, in column (6) we 
include controls for all two-way interactions (predicted assets by marital status, predicted assets by state, 
and married by state) so that the only variation used to identify Protected_Hat  is the three-way 
interaction of state by marital status by predicted assets.  Although the analysis often loses power when 
various sources of identifying variation are eliminated, the results indicate that the coefficient on 
Protected always remains negative and roughly of the same magnitude as the -0.011 in the baseline 
specification; it various from -0.0093 to -0.017 depending on the specification. The fact that all the 
sources of variation yield similar estimates increases our confidence in the empirical strategy and our 
baseline estimates.   18
Table 4 reports results from a number of additional sensitivity analyses. Column 1 replicates the IV 
estimates from our preferred specification (Table 3, column 2).  One potential concern is that two other 
aspects of Medicaid vary across state by marital status and may also affect insurance demand: the 
treatment of income and estate recovery practices.
5. Multi-collinearity in various Medicaid program rules’ 
generosity could produce a misleading estimate of the impact of Medicaid asset rules. Moreover, the 
impact of these other features of Medicaid on long-term care insurance demand are of independent 
interest.  Column 2 therefore adds two variables to control for these two features. The variable “Income” 
measures the amount of income (in units of $10,000) the household is allowed to keep and still qualify for 
Medicaid; this varies across states and within state by marital status.  “Liens” is an indicator variable for 
whether a state will put a lien on a house when one spouse is in the nursing home in order to recoup 
expenses upon the death of the community spouse.  This practice means that the house is no longer a 
bequeathable asset for married couples and the house is only a temporarily protected asset; there is no 
change for single households since the house is not a protected asset for them in any state.  Appendix A 
describes the state income and housing (“liens”) rules in more detail. The results in column 2 of Table 5 
show the expected positive coefficient on “Liens”, but the positive coefficient on “Income” is the opposite 
of what was expected. Neither coefficient is statistically significant, and an F-test indicates that they are 
not jointly significant (not shown). Perhaps most importantly, inclusion of these variables does little to 
change the parameter of interest, the coefficient on Protected.  
As discussed previously, the variation in our variable of interest Protected occurs mostly in the range 
of 20
th to 60
th percentile of the asset distribution of married individuals (see Figure 1). Therefore, column 
3 shows the results limiting the sample to this (albeit endogenous) range; as expected, the point estimate 
increases in absolute value. However, even with a doubling of the point estimate – to -0.0223 (standard 
error = 0.0130), the results still imply that even if all of the states decreased the amount of protected 
                                                 
5 Of course, many other aspects of Medicaid vary across state – such as reimbursement rates for nursing homes and 
whether and how much coverage is provided for home care. An advantage of our strategy is that because we do not 
use cross-state differences in Medicaid to identify its effects, we purge these differences and are able to focus on the 
effect of one particular Medicaid parameter of interest.   19
assets to the minimum allowable under federal law in 2000, the vast majority of individuals in our sample 
would remain without private insurance.  
Columns (4) and (5) reports the results from doing the analysis separately for younger ages (55-61) 
and older ages (62-69), respectively. The sample specification suggests the effect is stronger on younger 
ages – which may be because these individuals are more likely to be buying during the time of the 
analysis and thus the state rules in effect at that time are more likely to be the relevant one.  Columns (6) 
and (7) reports results for, respectively, those with a high school education or less and those with some 
college or more; the results are substantively and statistically indistinguishable. 
Finally, we have verified (in results not reported) that estimation of the reduced form OLS – in which 
Protected is replaced by Protected_Hat on the right hand side of equation (1) – yields qualitatively 
similar results to the instrumental variables estimation of equation (1), in which Protected is instrumented 
for with Protected_Hat. The coefficients on this reduced form estimation tend to be somewhat smaller 
(although still statistically significant) than the instrumental variables version; for example, a reduced 
form estimation of our preferred specification (shown in Table 3, column 2) yields a coefficient on 
Protected_Hat of -0.0052 (statistically significant at the 5 percent level) compared to the IV estimate of -
0.109. This is consistent with the introduction of measurement error in using Protected_Hat instead of 
Protected to measure the Medicaid rules faced by a given household. By contrast, estimating equation (1) 
with Protected rather than Protected_Hat on the right hand side results in a positive coefficient; this 
suggests that the issue of the potential endogeneity of assets to the Medicaid rules is in fact quantitatively 
important for our estimates.  
4. Simulated effects of potential Medicaid reforms 
The preceding analysis suggests a statistically significant crowd-out effect of Medicaid on demand for 
private long-term care insurance. Our central estimate suggests that a $10,000 increase in the amount of 
assets a household can hold and still be eligible for Medicaid is associated with a 1.1 percentage point 
decline in the probability of holding long-term care insurance. Relatedly, these findings suggest that 
increasing the stringency of Medicaid’s means testing – i.e. decreasing the amount of protected assets –    20
would induce greater demand for private insurance. In this section we provide a gauge of the magnitude 
of these crowd-out estimates by exploring their implications for the effect of potential Medicaid reforms 
in the size of the private long-term care insurance market. 
In particular, we consider what our estimates imply for how much long-term care insurance holdings 
would increase if all of the states decreased the amount of protected assets to the minimum allowable 
under federal law in 2000. These minimum federally allowable asset protection laws were $16,824 for a 
married couple, and $2,000 for a single individual. Currently, only 3 states (Arkansas, DC and Oregon) 
have rules this stringent, while 26 states have the most generous asset protection rules allowed by federal 
law. Given current state rules and the distribution of assets in the data, we estimate that this change would 
decrease the average protected assets for an individual in our sample by a little under $25,000. Our point 
estimates in column 4 therefore imply that this decrease in asset protection would be associated with an 
increase in private long term care insurance coverage by about 2.7 percentage points. This represents 
about a 30 percent increase in coverage relative to the current coverage rate of 9.1 percent. However, it 
suggests that the vast majority of the individuals in our sample would remain without private insurance.  
We also considered what our results imply for private long-term care insurance coverage if the 
minimum federally allowed asset protect laws were reduced by half (to $8,421 for a married couple and 
$1,000 for a single individual) and all states were to set their asset protection laws at their new minimum. 
Given the current state rules and the distribution of assets in the data, we estimate that this (out-of-
sample) change would decrease the average protected assets for an individual in our sample by almost 
$30,000, or by $5,000 more on average than the previous reform we considered. Our crowd-out estimates 
imply that a $30,000 decline in the amount of protected assets would be associated with a 3.3 percentage 
point increase in private long-term care insurance coverage rates. While this represents a more than one-
third increase over current insurance coverage rates, it would still leave over 85 percent of individuals in 
the sample without private insurance.  
These empirical findings are broadly consistent with the simulation-based evidence in Brown and 
Finkelstein (2004b). They find that recent policy reforms adopted in several states to allow individuals   21
who purchase private insurance to qualify for Medicaid coverage while retaining substantially more assets 
would have relatively little effect on the implicit tax that Medicaid imposes on private insurance, and 
hence little effect on demand for private insurance. Importantly, however, Brown and Finkelstein (2004b) 
estimate that Medicaid’s implicit tax has a large crowd-out effect on private insurance demand. Changes 
in asset protection by themselves however do not affect this implicit tax much because as long as 
Medicaid remains a secondary payer, even without any asset limits to Medicaid eligibility a large portion 
of private insurance benefits are redundant of what Medicaid would otherwise have paid. (By the same 
token, removing the secondary payer status without changing the Medicaid asset limits similarly leaves a 
large Medicaid implicit tax). Our empirical findings, coupled with the simulation-based evidence in 
Brown and Finkelstein (2004b) thus underscore the importance of understanding not just the size of the 
crowd out effect, but also the mechanism behind it in considering the likely impact of potential reforms to 
the public program on private demand. 
5. Conclusion 
Long-term care is a large, and largely uninsured, potential expense facing the elderly.  Medicaid 
serves as the insurer of last resort. As the baby boomers age, long-term care expenditures are expected to 
rise substantially, and with them Medicaid expenditures. This will put increasing pressure on state and 
federal budgets. As a result, increasing attention is focused on how public policy can stimulate the private 
long-term care insurance market. 
This paper looks empirically at the effects of the Medicaid program on private long-term care 
insurance demand.  We draw on the substantial variation in the level of assets that an individual can 
protect from Medicaid based on an individual’s state of residence, marital status and asset holdings to 
identify the impact of Medicaid on private long-term care insurance demand. Our estimates suggest that 
more generous Medicaid asset protection is associated with less private long-term care insurance 
coverage. Our central estimate implies that a $10,000 increase in the amount of assets a household can 
retain while qualifying for Medicaid coverage of long-term care expenditures is associated with a 1.1 
percentage point reduction in long-term care insurance coverage.   22
Although our findings point to a crowd-out effect of Medicaid asset protection on long-term care 
insurance demand, they also suggest that even large scale reductions in Medicaid asset protection are 
unlikely to stimulate private insurance coverage among most of the elderly population. We estimate that, 
if all states were to adopt the most stringent asset eligibility requirements allowed by federal law in 2000 
– $16,824 for a married couple and $2,000 for a single individual – and thereby decrease average 
protected assets by about $25,000, overall demand for private long-term care insurance would rise by 2.7 
percentage points, leaving almost 90 percent of the elderly still without private insurance.  
These empirical findings complement recent simulation research (Brown and Finkelstein, 2004b) 
which also suggest that changes in Medicaid’s asset protection rules would do little to address the lack of 
private long-term care insurance among most of the elderly. At the same time, Brown and Finkelstein 
(2004b) find that Medicaid may have a substantial crowd-out effect on long-term care insurance demand 
through the large implicit tax it places on the benefits from private long-term care insurance policies. 
Changes in Medicaid asset rules appear to not have much affect on this implicit tax, which may explain 
the simulation and empirical evidence that changes in Medicaid asset rules do not appear to have much 
effect on demand for private insurance. Together, these findings raise the important question of whether it 
is feasible to design Medicaid in a way that reduces the implicit tax it places on private insurance, and 
thus the constraints it appears to place on private insurance demand.   23
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Figure 1:Difference in Protected Assets
for Community Spouse









Note: Most common state rules apply in 26 states, second most common in 15 states. Dollar amounts are based on rules in 2000. The 
rules (and affected states) are described in more detail in Appendix A (see “case 1A” and “case 2A” respectively).  Percentiles denotes 
the percentile of the asset distribution for married households in the 2000 HRS.   27
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 (1)  (2) 
 Full  Sample  Constant Medicaid rules sub-sample  
Percent with LTC Insurance  9.6  9.1 
Average Age  61.5  61.6 
Percent Married  70.2  71.4 
Percent Male  48.1  48.1 
Percent Retired  40.2  39.8 
Average number of children  3.3  3.3 
Household Networth (in 
Thousands)   
 
 Mean  385  367 
 25
th Percentile  50  48 
 Median  157  153 
 75
th Percentile  387  391 
N   28,1000  17,623 
Note: “Full Sample” consists of individuals aged 55-69 in the 1996, 1998 or 2000 HRS who report their 
marital status and long-term care insurance coverage. “Constant Medicaid Rules” sub-sample is restricted 
to individuals who did not experience changes in marital status during our data (1996 – 2000) and who are 
in one of the 30 states that did not have real Medicaid asset rule changes between 1991-2000. Net worth is 
the HRS imputed value for net worth. It includes net financing worth, housing wealth, and defined 
contribution pension values, but does not include DB pension or Social Security wealth.  All statistics are 
calculated using household weights.  
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Table 2: Long-Term Care Insurance Ownership Rates  
 (1)  (2) 
Sample Full  Sample  Constant Medicaid rules sub-sample  
Entire Sample  9.6  9.1 
Males 9.7  9.0 
Females 9.4  9.3 
Singles 7.8  7.1 
Marrieds 10.3  10.0 
 
age 55-61  8.9 
8.1 
age 62-69  10.1  10.4 
 
wave = 1996  10.5 
9.9 
wave = 1998  9.3  9.0 
wave = 2000  9.1  8.6 
 
Net Worth, Bottom Quartile  4.1 
3.4 
Net Worth, 2nd Quartile  7.7  7.1 
Net Worth, 3rd Quartile  10.2  10.0 
Net Worth, Top Quartile  15.1  14.8 
Note: Full Sample consists of individuals aged 55-69 in the 1996, 1998 or 2000 HRS who report their 
marital status and long-term care insurance coverage.  “Constant Medicaid Rules” sub-sample is restricted 
to individuals who did not experience changes in marital status during our data (1996 – 2000) and who are 
in one of the 30 states that did not have real Medicaid asset rule changes between 1991-2000. Net worth is 
the HRS imputed value for net worth. It includes net financing worth, housing wealth, and defined 
contribution pension values, but does not include DB pension or Social Security wealth.  All statistics are 
calculated using household weights.  
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Table 3: Main crowd out estimates 
  Full Sample  Constant Medicaid Rules Sub-Sample 




















Additional  Controls    Asset  HAT  * 
married 
Asset HAT * state  Married * State  All two-way 
interactions 
Observations  24,841  15,576  15576 15576 15576 15576 
Notes: Table reports the results of estimating equation (1) by instrumental variables (IV); Protected_Hat is used as an instrument for Protected. All regressions use household 
weights. Protected and Protected_Hat are measured in units of $10,000. “Constant Medicaid rules sub-sample” restricts the sample to individuals whose marital status did not 
change between 1996 and 2000 and who are in states whose real Medicaid asset disregards did not change between 1991 and 2000. Columns (3) through (6) add additional 
controls to the specification in column (2), as indicated in the row labeled “additional controls”. Specifically, column 3 adds an interaction between predicted assets and marital 
status, Column 4 adds interactions between predicted assets and state dummies, Column 5 adds interactions between marital status and state dummies, and column 6 adds all three 
of these sets of two-way interactions in the previous three columns. Standard errors allowing for an arbitrary variance covariance matrix within each state are (in parentheses); 
standard errors calculated using a non-parametric bootstrap are [in square brackets] (see text for more details). ***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent 
and 10 percent level respectively, based on the standard errors (in parentheses). All regressions include indicator variables for marital status, state fixed effects, education 
categorical dummies, gender, occupation, industry, number of children up to five, age, retired, HRS cohort, race, Hispanic, and HRS wave, as well as education categorical 
dummies interacted with the indicators for marital status, gender, occupation, industry, number of children up to five, age, retired, HRS cohort, race, Hispanic and HRS wave.  
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Education or Less 
(6) 
Some College or 
More 
(7) 
















INCOME  0.0363           
   (0.4285) 
 
        
LIENS   0.0087           
   (0.0175)          
Observations 15576  15576  6029  8552  7024  9,452  6,124 
Note:  Table reports the results of estimating equation (1) by instrumental variables (IV) on the constant Medicaid rules sub-sample; Protected_Hat is used as an instrument for 
Protected. All regressions use household weights. Protected and Protected_Hat are measured in units of $10,000. Column 1 replicates the baseline results (from Table 3, column 
2).  Column 2 adds controls for other Medicaid rules, specifically the amount of income (in units of $10,000) that a household can keep and still qualify for Medicaid (“Income”), 
and an indicator variable for whether a state will put a lien on a house when one spouse is in a nursing home in order to recoup expenses upon the death of the community spouse 
(“Liens”).  Column 3 limits the sample to individuals in the 20
th to 60
th percentile of the asset distribution of married individuals (which is the range in which the variation in 
Protected is largest). Columns 4 and 5 look separately at individuals aged 55-61 and 62-69. Columns 6 and 7 look separately at individuals with a high school education or less and 
individuals with some college education or more. Standard errors allowing for an arbitrary variance covariance matrix within each state are (in parentheses); standard errors 
calculated using a non-parametric bootstrap are [in square brackets] (see text for more details). ***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent 
level respectively, based on the standard errors (in parentheses). All regressions include indicator variables for marital status, state fixed effects, education categorical dummies, 
gender, occupation, industry, number of children up to five, age, retired, HRS cohort, race, Hispanic, and HRS wave, as well as education categorical dummies interacted with the 
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Appendix A: Overview of Medicaid Rules 
This appendix discusses in some detail the rules that govern financial eligibility for Medicaid. 
We focus primarily on the rules regarding the amount of financial assets that an individual or 
couple is permitted to keep and still receive Medicaid reimbursement for nursing homes. We 
label this value Protected in our empirical work in the main body of the paper; it is our key 
variable of interest. We also briefly discuss the rules regarding Medicaid income disregards and 
Medicaid treatment of housing wealth; we briefly explore the impact of these variables in the 
sensitivity analysis presented in Table 5. 
Medicaid rules vary considerably across states. Within each state, the rules pertaining to a 
single individual who goes into a nursing home differ from those pertaining to married 
individuals who go into a nursing home whose spouse remains in the community. Since the 
differential rules within state by marital status form the main source of our empirical 
identification strategy, we discuss these differences in some detail. 
Appendix Table A1 provides a summary of the various Medicaid rules for nursing home 
expenses for single and for married people in each state as of 2000. We now discuss each briefly 
in turn. At the end of this section, we turn to a discussion of state rule changes over the 1991 to 
2000 period.  
 
Rules for single individuals in 2000 
Medicaid rules for single individuals are relatively simple and uniform across states.  
 
Maximum amount of retainable assets: They can keep no more financial wealth than the 
Medicaid-specified asset limit. Anything above these must go toward paying for the care. In 
2000, the modal asset limit was $2,000 (which nearly 70 percent of states used). The remaining 
states have an asset limit that ranges from $1,500 to $6,500.  
 
Maximum amount of retainable monthly income: They can keep no more monthly income than 
the Personal Needs Allowance (PNA). In 2000, these ranged from $30 to $77 per month. 
Rules regarding housing wealth: They must sell their house (and use the proceeds to pay for that 
care), unless there is a chance of recovery or a dependent child living in the house. 
 
Rules for married individuals (one spouse in NH, one in community)
6 
Treatment of financial assets: 
When one spouse enters a nursing home, total household financial (non-housing) assets (A) 
are attributed evenly between the two spouses.  From this even attribution, the spouse that goes 
into a nursing home is allowed to keep only the Medicaid-specified income and asset limits for 
single individuals (i.e. $30-$77 a month of income and approximately $2,000 of assets).   
The main source of variation used in our empirical work is the amount of assets that the 
community spouse is allowed to keep. This amount depends on the total amount of household 
financial assets (A) and the state rules regarding the minimum and maximum assets that the 
community spouse is allowed to keep (STATEMIN and STATEMAX respectively). A 
community spouse whose share of the assets is below the state minimum allowable (STATEMIN) 
is allowed to take assets from the nursing home spouse to top-up their asset level up to 
STATEMIN.  
In setting the minimum and maximum amount of assets the community spouse can retain, the 
states are constrained to set a minimum (STATEMIN) that is at least as high as the federal 
                                                 
6 For the less common case when both spouses need nursing home care, they are essentially treated as two 
single individuals in terms of the treatment of assets, income and housing. The one exception is that some 
states set a lower threshold for the amount of assets the couple can keep ($3,000 combined instead of 
$2,000 each).   32
minimum (FEDMIN) and to set the maximum (STATEMAX) no higher than the Federal 
maximum (FEDMAX).
7  
In all states therefore, married couples with combined assets of less than the Federal 
Minimum ($16,824 in 2000) face the same treatment of their assets (they are allowed to keep all 
of them). Furthermore, in all but 5 states, married couples with combined assets of more than 
twice the Federal maximum (i.e. $168,240 in 2000) are allowed to keep the same amount 
($84,120).
8 The differential treatment across states of married couples’ assets therefore occurs 
mainly for couples with assets between the Federal Minimum and twice the Federal Maximum. In 
2000, these limits were $16,824 and $168,240 respectively, and correspond to the 20
th and 58
th 
percentile of financial assets for married households in the 2000 HRS. Married households in this 
“affected range” have average assets of $74,266.
9   
For married couples with assets between the Federal Minimum and twice the Federal 
Maximum, there is substantial variation across states in the amount of assets they are allowed to 
retain. This variation arises from where states choose to set their State Minimum and State 
Maximum allowable retainable assets. 
Figure A1 compares the amount of assets that the community spouse can keep under the two 
most common state rules. In the first, which is used in 26 states, the state sets both the minimum 
and maximum allowable assets (STATEMIN and STATEMAX) to the Federal Maximum. Under 
these rules, the household faces a 0 percent marginal tax rate on its assets until it reaches the state 
minimum amount of allowed retainable assets, at which point it faces a 100 percent marginal tax 
rate on all further assets. We refer to this as “Case 1A” and illustrate it with the dark line in 
Figure A1.
10  
The second most common set of state rules (which apply in 15 states), set the state minimum 
equal to the federal minimum allowable retainable assets, and the state maximum equal to the 
federal maximum allowable retainable assets. This is shown by the dashed line in Figure A1. In 
this case, the marginal tax rate faced on assets goes from 0%, to 100%, to 50% and then back to 
100%, as shown in the figure.
11 
Figure 1 graphs the difference in the amount of assets a community spouse can keep (as a 
function of total household financial assets) if they are in a Case 1A state relative to a Case 2A  
As is readily apparent, this difference is non-monotonic in the couples’ assets.  
The difference in the amount of allowable retained assets is quite substantial. For example, if 
all married couples were to move from Case 1A states to Case 2A states, the average difference in 
the amount a household is allowed to keep would be $8,277 in the whole sample, which is 
approximately 2 percent of average assets.  For those in the “affected range” (20
th to 58
th 
percentile of assets i.e. between  $16,824 and $168,240), this move would on average allow them 
to keep $21,715 more in assets, which represents 29 percent of average financial assets in this 
range.  The maximum change in the amount of assets that the household would be able to keep is 
$67,296 and occurs for households with assets of $84,120. 
Finally, we note that while we have focused on the two major types of state rules, there are 10 
other states whose rules differ from those in Cases 1A and 2A. For the sake of brevity we do not 
discuss these rules in detail; they are summarized in Table A1. Like the two more common cases 
                                                 
7 In 2000, the FEDMIN and FEDMAX were, respectively, $16,824 and $84,120 (Stone 2002). They are 
indexed to the CPI but have otherwise remained unchanged between the 1991 and 2000 period. 
8 The five state exceptions are AR, DC, NY, OR, and SC. 
9 These are summary stats on the 2000 HRS, using financial assets.  The sample is limited to married 




10 The 26 states in this category are: AK, AZ, CA, CO, FL, GA, HI, IL, KY, LA, MA, MD, ME, MI, MS, 
MO, ND, NE, NV, OK, SD, VT, WA, WI, WV, and WY. 
11 The 15 states in this category are: CT, ID, IN, KS, MT, NC, NH, NJ, OH, PA, RI, TN, TX, UT, and VA.   33
discussed above, the difference across states in the treatment of assets is non-monotonic in the 
couples’ assets across these other cases as well (relative to each other or the two more common 
cases). It is also non-trivial in magnitude. 
 
Treatment of Income: Income is split based on the “name on the check” rule, rather than evenly 
between the two spouses as is the case for assets, in all but 2 states.  The institutionalized 
individual is allowed to keep the same amount of income as a single household (defined above as 
the PNA).  The community spouse is allowed to keep an unlimited amount of income if it is in 
her name. If the community spouse’s income is below a minimum amount known as the 
community spouse income limit (CSIL), then she is eligible to keep enough of her 
institutionalized spouse’s income to bring her total income up to that limit. This minimum income 
amount varies across states from approximately $1,407 to $2,133 per month as shown in Table 
A1. 
 
Treatment of Housing: The house of a community spouse is left out of the calculation of assets or 
income and it is completely protected for the community spouse during her lifetime. It may be of 
unlimited value. However, about one-quarter of states will put a lien on this house, which allows 
the state to collect money from the sale of the house to reimburse them for their Medicaid outlays 
upon the sale of the house or the death of the community spouse. We refer to such states as LIEN 
states. Enforcement of estate recovery practices varies across states (Sabatino and Wood, 1996).  
 
Changes in Rules. 
All of the preceding discussion applies to the state rules in 2000. For purposes of the empirical 
work, it is important to know whether states changed their rules at some point, as individuals 
might have purchased or considered purchasing long-term care insurance under a different set of 
rules. As discussed in the text, there was a major change in rules in 1988 (effective in 1989), 
which motivated our focus on an age group who was likely to be of buying age after 1988. We 
also tracked down information on rule changes between 1991 and 2000. There is no central 
database for state-specific Medicaid eligibility rules. We compiled a timeline for these state-
specific rule changes by collecting a variety of different sources that covered the different years; 
where sources disagreed, we telephoned the relevant agency in the state to ascertain the correct 
information. We were unable to obtain state-specific information between 1989 and 1991.
12 
There were no major changes in the Medicaid rules for single individuals during this time 
period. However, for married individuals, 21 states changed their assets protection rules for the 
community spouse between 1991 and 2000 (see Appendix Table A1). In addition, 27 states 
changed the allowable income limit for institutionalized individuals (PNA). Finally, over our 
period 13 states introduced estate recovery plans (LIENS). 
                                                 
12 Our specific sources for state Medicaid rules from 1991- 2000 are:  Bruen et al (1998); Congressional 
Research Service (1993); Horvath (1997); Kassner and Shirley (1998); the National Association of 
Medicaid Directors; Price (1996); Sabatino and Wood (1996); Schwab (1998); Stone (2002), and telephone 
calls to particular states.   34
Table A1: Medicaid Eligibility Parameters by State, 2000 





















spouse (CSIL)  











AK  2,000 75  84,120 2,103  01
AL  2,000 30  25,000 1,407  10
AR*  2,000 40  16,824 1,407  01
AZ  2,000 76.80  84,120 2,103  01
CA  2,000 35  84,120 2,103  11
CO  2,000 50  84,120 1,407  10
CT  1,600 52  16,824 1,407  11
DC*  2,600 42  16,824 2,103  01
DE  2,000 70  25,000 1,407  10
FL  2,000 35  84,120 2,103  01
GA  3,000 30  84,120 2,103  01
HI  2,000 30  84,120 2,103  11
IA  2,000 30  24,000 2,103  00
ID  2,000 30  16,824 1,407  11
IL  2,000 30  84,120 2,103  11
IN  1,500 50  16,824 1,407  01
KS  2,000 30  16,824 1,407  01
KY  2,000 40  84,120 2,103  01
LA  2,000 38  84,120 2,103  01
MA  6,500    60  84,120 1,407  10
MD  2,500 40  84,120 2,049  10
ME  3,000 40  84,120 2,103  00
MI  2,000 60  84,120 2,103  00
MN  3,000 67  23,774 1,407  11
MO  2,000 30  16,824 1,407  01
MS  2,000 44  84,120 2,103  01
MT  2,000 40  16,824 2,103  11
NC  2,000 30  16,824 2,103  01
ND  3,000 40  84,120 2,103  01
NE  4,000 50  84,120 1,407  00
NH  2,500 50  16,824 2,103  01
NJ  4,000 35  16,824 1,407  01
NM  2,000 45  31,290 1,407  01
NV  2,000 35  84,120 2,103  00
NY*  3,600 50  74,820
* 2,103  10
OH  1,500 40  16,824 1,407  01
OK  2,000 50  84,120 2,103  00
OR*  2,000 30  16,824 1,407  01
PA  2,400 30  16,824 1,407  01
RI  4,000 50  16,824 1,407  1  35
SC*  2,000 30  66,480 1,662  00
SD  2,000 30  84,120 1,407  00
TN  2,000 30  16,824 1,407  01
TX  2,000 45  16,824 2,103  01
UT  2,000 45  16,824 1,407  01
VA  2,000 30  16,824 1,407  01
VT  2,000 47.66  84,120 1,407  01
WA  2,000 41.62  84,120 1,407  01
WI  2,000 45  84,120 1,875  11
WV  2,000 50  84,120 1,407  00
WY  2,000 30  84,120 2,103  01
Source: Stone 2002, Sabatino and Wood 1996, and authors’ corrections based on telephone conversations with 
particular states where other sources disagreed with those listed here. 
Notes:   
•  For all states, the maximum amount of assets the community spouse is allowed to keep 
(STATEMAX) is the same (and equal to FEDMAX) unless the state is denoted with a * in which 
case STATEMAX=STATEMIN. 
•  Treatment of housing for single individuals is not described in the table since it is the same in all 
states (see text).  
•  PNA stands for Personal Needs Allowance 
•  CSIL stands for Community Spouse Income Limit. 
•  In 2000, FEDMIN and FEDMAX were $16,824 and $84,120, respectively.   36
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